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Naturalism and Metaphors




1 The work of Richard Rorty, arguably the most significant neopragmatist philosopher, has
received very little support in aesthetics. Rorty’s fellow pragmatist Richard Shusterman
has presented the most systematic critical assessment of Rorty’s work, and some parts of
his pragmatist theory are in direct confrontation with Rorty’s views. Shusterman’s most
significant  misgivings  concerning  Rorty’s  neopragmatism  from  the  point  of  view  of
aesthetics are connected with the dominant position he sees Rorty placing on language in
the  constitution  of  human  experience  (Shusterman  1997:  158-62;  Shusterman  2006:
227n2).  Instead  of  embracing  the  view of  human  experience  found  in  John  Dewey’s
pragmatism that emphasizes its layered character Shusterman equates the conception of
experience  he  sees  underpinning  Rorty’s  work  with  a  view  called  “hermeneutic
universalism,” which is usually used as a short term for a conception in which language is
considered the essential condition of thought and meaningful experience (Shusterman
2000: 238-9, 253-4). Moreover, when the individualistic aestheticism characterizing the
activity of “the liberal ironist,” the central figure of Rorty’s social philosophy, is taken
into account, Rorty’s views ultimately drift surprisingly far, Shusterman claims, from the
democratic and communal aims central to John Dewey’s aesthetics (ibid.: 246-50). Hence, a
pragmatist conception of aesthetics must be built on a different kind of ground than
Rorty’s work provides.
2 Shusterman’s  criticism  of  Rorty’s  neopragmatism,  however,  is  by  no  means
unproblematic.  By  criticizing  Rorty’s  work  for  slipping  into  a  view  which  he  terms
“linguistic  mentalism”  (ibid.:  258),  Shusterman  arguably  associates  Rorty’s
neopragmatism  with  a  philosophical  conception  known  as  “linguistic  idealism,”  a
metaphysical doctrine which sees reality as essentially language-constructed. This kind of
reading of  Rorty’s  work has in recent commentary literature been seen to provide a
highly misguided view of its philosophical underpinnings.1 The significance of this body
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of  literature  in  this  context  is  that  it  directs  the  focus  onto  an  aspect  of  Rorty’s
neopragmatism that Shusterman does not take properly into consideration in his critical
reading of  Rorty’s  work.  This  is  the  connection Rorty’s  neopragmatism bears  to  the
tradition of naturalistic philosophy. The basic tenet of Rorty’s naturalism maintains that
a human’s relationship to his or her surroundings is constructed purely causally in the
sense  that  it  does  not  contain  any  kinds  of  mediating  elements,  such  as  mental
representations. This naturalistic outlook serves as a foundation for Rorty’s critique of
empiricist conceptions of knowledge that he supplements with the idea of “the myth of
the given” introduced by Wilfrid Sellars.
3 Taking  up  the  naturalism characterizing  Rorty’s  neopragmatism and  the  critique  of
empiricist conceptions of knowledge it involves might seem irrelevant to aesthetics. This,
however, is not the case. The full relevance of these parts of Rorty’s neopragmatism is
revealed once they are connected with a view underlying Rorty’s conception of literature,
namely  Donald  Davidson’s  theory  of  metaphor.  Davidson’s  account  of  metaphor  is
important  for  Rorty’s  general  naturalistic  outlook,  for,  in his  opinion,  it  provides an
ample framework for explaining the significance and value of art, literature and other
similar phenomena in the context of naturalistic philosophy. Davidson’s view, in other
words,  implies  that  “a  proper  acknowledgement  of  the  cultural  role  of  imaginative
literature (and, more generally, of art, myth, and religion – all the ‘higher’ things) is [not]
incompatible with a naturalistic philosophy” (Rorty 1991: 124).
4 Observing  the  influence  of  Davidson’s  theory  of  metaphor  on  Rorty’s  conception  of
literature deepens the problems of Shusterman’s critique of Rorty’s neopragmatism. This
is because the decisive feature of Davidson’s view of metaphor which separates it from
other influential accounts is that it does not explain the work of metaphor by assuming
metaphors possess a second, metaphorical level of meaning above the literal meanings of
utterances that is assumed to ground the content of a metaphorical expression (Davidson
1984/78: 245). Instead, Davidson unpacks the mystery of metaphors by concentrating on
the  effects  metaphorical  uses  of  language  cause.  Davidson  does  acknowledge  that
metaphors “make us notice aspects of things we did not notice before, bring surprising
analogies and similarities to our attention and […] provide a kind of lens” (ibid.:  261).
What Davidson, however,  denies is that “metaphor does its work by having a special
meaning, a specific cognitive content” (ibid.: 262). This is in other words to say that in the
Davidsonian scheme, the work of metaphor is not primarily explained in linguistic terms.
This is also shown by Rorty’s understanding of Davidson’s approach, for he compares the
effects metaphors are described as having on conversations in the Davidsonian model
with the effects such phenomena as slapping one’s interlocutor’s face or kissing him have
in similar situations (Rorty 1989: 18). Rorty, in fact, explicitly calls the phenomena, the
effects of which bear a likeness to the effects of metaphors, “non-linguistic” (Rorty 1991:
167).
5 In the following paper, I shall discuss Rorty’s conception of literature in light of the effect
Davidson’s theory of metaphor had on it, as well as re-examine the relevance of Rorty’s
neopragmatism for pragmatist conceptions of aesthetics and philosophy of art. Though it
will form a sort of background, dwelling on the problems of Shusterman’s critique of
Rorty will not play a major role in the paper. I raise this issue primarily to situate my own
stance on Rorty’s pragmatism within some other readings it has received in philosophy of
art.
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6 I  begin  the  paper  by  examining  the  impact  Davidson’s  account  had  on  the  view of
metaphor  Rorty’s  neopragmatist  naturalism  includes.  One  way  in  which  the  high
prospects  Rorty  assigns  to  Davidson’s  ideas  in  explaining  art’s  significance  within  a
naturalistic framework can be illuminated is by way of examining the role Rorty sketches
for metaphors in his postmetaphysical liberalist culture, and especially the value he sees
them having in  enhancing one of  the  central  values  of  this  kind of  society,  namely
solidarity. Rorty does not himself connect his naturalistic account of metaphor with the
social  role he attaches to metaphors that  explicitly. My belief  is  that  the more fully
worked out reading of this connection I shall offer provides new insights into the reasons
that make metaphors valuable for Rorty’s postmetaphysical liberalist cultural aims. This
investigation is  also  significant  with respect  to  Shusterman’s  critique of  Rorty,  for  I
believe it shows that there is a strong communal aspect in Rorty’s thinking on aesthetics
and literature that readings addressing Rorty’s views through the notion of the liberalist
ironist, such as Shusterman’s, fail to embrace. In fact, my belief is that Rorty’s conception
of art and literature overlaps in some significant ways with the emphases central for John
Dewey’s aesthetic theory. I close by outlining some wider implications the fuller account
of Rorty’s philosophy of literature provided in the paper has for the place of pragmatism
within  contemporary  aesthetics.  Pointing  out  the  similarities  between  Rorty’s  and
Dewey’s conceptions of aesthetics will be an important part of this examination. In my
opinion, the assessment of Rorty’s work I provide shows that Shusterman’s view of its
relevance for philosophy of art and aesthetics is too negative.
 
II. Naturalism and Metaphors in Rorty’s
Neopragmatism
7 As Michael Williams points out, to talk of naturalism in connection with Rorty’s work may
sound strange, given that Rorty’s name is usually associated with postmodernism and
other such traditions of thought with very different philosophical undercurrents from
those characterizing forms of naturalism (Williams 2009: xv). This is especially the case
with such fields as aesthetics and philosophy of art. One of the central features of Rorty’s
naturalism is that, in Rorty’s hands, naturalism turns into a purely negative view, in the
sense that it rejects certain traditional ways of thinking about the relationship between
human beings and their surroundings without, however, offering a detailed positive view
in  their  place  which  would  try  to  provide  more  satisfactory  analyses  about  truth,
knowledge, and reality, which preoccupy the views it opposes.
8 In short, the view of human subjectivity Rorty opposes is the idea that we are in touch
with our surroundings in terms of representations and that the character of our contact
with the world is  determined by how closely  the representations  our  minds contain
correspond to the way the world actually is. The decisive difference between this deeply
grained conception of what it is to be human, which, in Rorty’s opinion, has dominated
most  of  modern  philosophy,  and  his  naturalism  is  that  in  the  latter  case  human’s
relationship with his or her surroundings is considered purely causal by nature, that is, to
put it in Rorty’s own words, naturalized theories of the mind and language of the kind he
supports make “all questions about the relation of either to the rest of the universe causal
questions, as opposed to questions about the adequacy of representation and expression”
(Rorty 1989: 15).
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9 Davidson has  helpfully  formulated this  distinction in  terms of  a  distinction between
“causal  intermediaries”  and  “epistemic  intermediaries”  (Davidson  2001:  144).  While
sensations do have a causal role in our beliefs, they do not by themselves determine the
content of our beliefs and, hence, they cannot serve as reasons for our beliefs (ibid.: 143).
This view of justification is in line with the Sellarsian critique of empiricism Rorty draws
on,  which  maintains  that  sensations  are  by  themselves  mute  and  that  they  cannot,
therefore, be cited as reasons for beliefs but that justification always takes place in “the
logical space of reasons.” Rorty summarizes the view of the relationship between the
mind and the world arising from these different accounts by saying that “the pragmatist
recognizes relations of justification holding between beliefs and desires, and relations of
causation holding between these beliefs and desires and other items in the universe but
not relations of representation” (Rorty 1991: 37).
10 The  kind  of  naturalism  Rorty  supports  implies  a  position  that  many  may  find
unappealing. This is the fact that it does not construe a decisive difference between the
character that a human’s relationship to the world takes and that characterizing the
relationship  of  other  animals.  For  naturalism,  this  difference  is  more  a  matter  of
difference of degree than of kind. Both relationships are constructed purely causally, the
causal processes involved in human life simply being much more complex in character
(Rorty 2007: 113-4).
11 Rorty  thinks  that  a  decisive  reason  why  this  sort  of  naturalistic  outlook  on  human
subjectivity has been opposed is that it seems to jeopardize the supposed uniqueness of
humans among other creatures, as well as the high value we attach to our products like
works of literature. One way in which the threat in question here can be expressed is that,
as Rorty himself puts it, the naturalistic view of the kind underlying his neopragmatism
would  seem  to  imply  that  we  “secrete  […]  symphonies  as  our  spleen  secretes  dark
humors” (Rorty 1979: 44).
12 The worry expressed in this response to naturalism, however, is unwarranted. The causal
relations constructing our lives do not have their origin solely in natural processes but
humans have the power to create artefacts with similar impacts,  and in Rorty’s view
metaphors are among the most powerful tools of this kind. Explaining the development
of human life solely by natural causes will take one only so far. An explanation of how
humans developed “from the relative mindlessness of the monkey to the full-fledged
mindedness of the human […] takes us off into neurology and thence into evolutionary
biology,” while an explanation of how we got “from speaking Neanderthal to speaking
postmodern […] takes us into intellectual history as the history of metaphor” (Rorty 1989:
16).
13 Yet, any account of metaphor will not do for Rorty and it is precisely Davidson’s theory
that  Rorty  considers  a  particularly  apt  basis  for  developing  an  explanation  of  the
significance of culture within a naturalistic philosophy. The main reason for this is that it
is metaphysically on the same plane as the naturalist outlook he supports. For Rorty,
Davidson’s view of metaphor does not merely mark an attempt to get hold of a cunning
phenomenon of language but it squares well with the concerns of naturalistic philosophy
in  general.  Most  importantly,  Davidsonian  philosophy  of  language  allows  us  to  see
language, not as a medium between self and world but as a tool for doing different sorts
of things. For Rorty, this view “is part of a larger attempt to get rid of the traditional
philosophical picture of what it is to be human” (ibid.: 19).
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14 What  makes  Davidson’s  theory  of  metaphor  naturalistic  for  Rorty  is  precisely  the
rejection it exhibits towards the idea that metaphors carry a special kind of message, that
is, that metaphors include, in addition to their literal meaning, a kind of ideal level of
meaning that grounds their cognitive content. The general goal of Rorty’s naturalistic
account of metaphors is to call into question the meaningfulness of explaining the value
of art by assuming that art communicates cognitive content in a way similar to some
other fields of discourse in our culture, such as science. Instead, Rorty insists, we should
try to explain the significance of literature and other cultural artefacts in other ways than
by “trying to ‘broaden’ either semantic or epistemic notions” (Rorty 1991: 163). This is
precisely what Davidson’s approach to metaphor makes possible, for:
by putting metaphor outside the pale of semantics, insisting that a metaphorical
sentence has no meaning other than its literal one, Davidson lets us see metaphors
on the model of unfamiliar events in the natural world – causes of changing beliefs
and  desires  –  rather  than  on  the  model  of  representations  of  unfamiliar  worlds,
worlds which are ‘symbolic’ rather than ‘natural.’ (Ibid.)
15 Effective metaphors make us see things in a different light. Yet, metaphors do not have to
be assumed to possess cognitive content to achieve this. Rorty elaborates the naturalistic
account of the cognitive value of metaphor with the distinction between causes of beliefs
and reasons for beliefs. Metaphors are for him similar to other “unfamiliar noises” we
encounter in that their functioning cannot be fully predicted by our present means and
they cannot be assigned determinate content by our present cognitive resources. For this
reason metaphors cannot serve as reasons for beliefs. This, however, does not deprive
metaphors of cognitive significance, for their lack of cognitive content does not imply
that they could not have a causal role in shaping our beliefs and desires. Good metaphors
make us attend to novel aspects in our environment and they can, thus, make us change
our beliefs. This, however, does not mean that the metaphor expresses the novel belief we
come to hold as a result of the cognitions the metaphor causes in us. From a naturalistic
perspective, it is in other words a mistake to think that a metaphor’s capacity to reveal
new aspects in one’s surroundings is based on its conveying information that we come to
acquire as a result of grasping the meaning of the metaphor (ibid.:  169).  As Davidson
himself explains, “joke or dream or metaphor can, like a picture or a bump on the head,
make us appreciate some fact – but not by standing for, or expressing the fact” (Davidson
1984/78: 262).
16 This is to say that despite their lack of cognitive content, metaphors are nevertheless
responsible for a lot of cognitions that may eventually cause us to change our beliefs. This
shows how metaphors can be effectual without possessing definitive cognitive content; if
a  particular  metaphor  “had  not  turned  up,  we  would  not  have  been  moved  […]  to
formulate and deploy certain sentences which do have such [cognitive] content” (Rorty
1991:  168).  Even though they do not themselves express beliefs  or open up symbolic
worlds, metaphors, by making us attend to novel aspects in our environment, can have a
causal  role  in  the  formation  of  our  beliefs.  This  explains  how  metaphors  can  be
cognitively  significant,  that  is,  how  they  can  change  our  beliefs  without  possessing
cognitive content of the kind beliefs possess. From Rorty’s point of view, the mistake of
empiricist conceptions of knowledge and cognitive-idealist theories of metaphor is thus
ultimately one and the same, namely a failure to see that “a stimulus to knowledge” does
not itself have to convey knowledge (ibid.: 169).
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IV. Metaphors of Solidarity and Imagination
17 Bringing the naturalistic  undercurrents  of  Rorty’s  neopragmatism into sharper  focus
highlights previously unnoticed aspects in his work on philosophy art. It also undermines
the critical reading Shusterman has presented of Rorty’s work. If metaphors are central
means  of  cultural  change and development,  and if  in Rorty’s  account  their  effect  is
compared, not to the effect linguistic items like beliefs and sentences have on us, but to
the  effects  engendered  by  various  non-linguistic  phenomena,  it  is  arguable  that
Shusterman’s  understanding  of  Rorty  as  a  strong  textualist  is  misguided.  Recent
pragmatist work in aesthetics seems to follow Shusterman’s conception of the role of
language in Rorty’s philosophy rather closely. The strength of these accounts is, however,
weakened by their failing to take into consideration the impact of Davidson’s view of
metaphor  on  Rorty’s  view,  and  how  Rorty’s  philosophy  of  literature  builds  on  his
conception  of  naturalism.2 The  slight  one-sidedness  characterizing  the  reception  of
Rorty’s work within aesthetics and philosophy of literature is unfortunate, for it has no
doubt discouraged attempts at more thorough assessments of its value for aesthetics. I
shall provide such an assessment at the end of my paper, and working out the communal
aspect of Rorty’s thinking on aesthetics revealed by the position metaphors have in his
social philosophy, a topic I shall now turn to, will be important for this purpose.
18 The full import of Davidson’s account of metaphor for Rorty’s neopragmatism becomes
apparent  from  the  position  Rorty  assigns  to  literature  and  metaphors  in  the
postmetaphysical,  liberalist  society  he  sketches.  Especially  solidarity  receives  an
important position in Rorty’s view. By solidarity Rorty refers to a feeling of communality
between human beings and to the capacity of being alert and sensitive to the kinds of
pain and humiliation people may be subjected to. Rorty’s account of liberalism is founded
on Judith Sklar’s view of liberalists as “the people who think that cruelty is the worst
thing we do” (Rorty 1989: xv). For Rorty, solidarity is an inherently local phenomenon,
which is to say that it has to be constructed out of different pieces in different contexts
and perhaps even recreated from the most unexpected elements once new unforeseeable
situations emerge, rather than something to be understood in terms of a common human
nature people share and as something already waiting for us in advance (Rorty 1989: 94).
19 The  attempt  at  increasing  the  “sense  of  ‘us’”  Rorty  finds  central  to  the  feeling  of
solidarity requires “skill at recognizing and describing the different sorts of little things
around which individuals or communities center their fantasies and their lives” (ibid.: 93).
Hence,  one capacity receiving an important  role  in the enhancement of  solidarity  is
imaginative engagement with other people. The sense of us lying at the heart of solidarity
requires that we develop ways of discerning similarities and differences between human
groups upon which the feeling of communality underlying solidarity can be built.  As
Rorty explains the importance of imaginative engagement for his position on solidarity,
“skill at imaginative identification does the work which the liberal metaphysician would
like to have done by a specifically moral motivation – rationality or the love of God […]”
(ibid.).
20 Metaphors  are  important  parts  of  this  imaginative  engagement.  Since  the  feeling  of
solidarity requires perceiving similarities and differences between oneself and those one
tries to relate to in a given context, a metaphor achieving this sort of bond becomes an
important  means  of  enhancing  solidarity.  Metaphors  can  make  us  notice  novel
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similarities between different things and in this respect they have a role in increasing the
presence of solidarity. However, it seems that Davidson’s naturalistic view of metaphor
manages to embrace the role Rorty attributes to metaphors in enhancing solidarity in a
particularly apt way.  This is  because it  is  in line with the contextual  and contingent
account of solidarity Rorty offers. This account insists on the impossibility of fixing a
permanent ground for developing a method for enhancing the presence of solidarity and
instead emphasizes that attempts at increasing solidarity always take place in contingent
historical circumstances and that it may thus require unforeseeable building blocks.
21 The  scepticism  the  naturalistic  account  of  metaphor  exhibits  towards  the  idea  that
metaphors carry a cognitive content implies a highly rich and dynamic view of the effects
of metaphors. Metaphors do not transmit belief-like states with a specified content which
the receiver, after having grasped the content of the metaphor, places alongside his or
her current beliefs, and which he or she then assesses in relation to them, ultimately
either rejecting or accepting the belief the metaphor conveys. The naturalistic account
provides a different view of  the effect  of  a metaphor.  As the metaphor does not say 
anything more than what the words in their literal  meaning express,  neither does it
straightforwardly tell  how the likenesses  the metaphor draws attention to should be
understood (Davidson 1984/78: 255). This shows that working out the significance of the
metaphor  requires  much  more  effort  and  sensitivity  of  perception  than  the  mere
weighing of the validity of a newly encountered belief. In the Davidsonian model, the
effects of metaphors thus become highly multi-faceted and intensive phenomena, and the
change in beliefs  they cause are comparable to an awakening kind of  state,  like the
experience of regaining consciousness after a blow on the head.
22 Though Rorty does not develop his view of metaphors as one of the central means for
enhancing the feeling of  solidarity in relation to Davidson’s naturalistic account that
explicitly, the picture of the engagement with a metaphor that view implies reveals the
full significance metaphors may have in furthering the social values central to Rorty’s
liberalism. The engagement with a metaphor structurally overlaps in some significant
respects with the sensitivity and alertness to contextual detail Rorty finds central to the
enhancement of solidarity. Metaphors stir the same kind of mental powers that are also
at the heart of the construction of solidarity,  and thus metaphors become important
devices for developing those capacities required in the enhancement of solidarity. There
is no common set of rules or axioms with the help of which it could be possible to spell
out what the capacity to feel solidarity with one’s neighbours in every possible situation
requires. Similarly, it is impossible to give a definite list of how the similarities a given
metaphor can cause us to see should be understood and the effect the metaphor may have
on our beliefs and desires. As in the case of solidarity, all one can do with respect to
metaphors is to stay imaginatively alert. In this respect, it is understandable why Rorty
thinks that the question “How do metaphors work?” is in fact in no substantial sense
different from such questions as “What is the nature of the unexpected?” or “How do
surprises work?” (Rorty 1991: 106).
23 These  reflections  show  that  for  Rorty  the  value  of  metaphors  lies  primarily  in  the
platform engagements with metaphors afford for the development of the imaginative
mental powers central to the enhancement of solidarity. Yet, metaphors are not only
important  as  surprising  “unfamiliar  noises”  but  the  process  in  which  a  metaphor
gradually loses its metaphorical quality and as a result of which it begins to resemble
literal expressions with a specified and shared content can have valuable outcomes as
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well.  The  distinction  between  causes  and  reasons  becomes  important  once  again.
According to Rorty, for Davidson the distinction between cognitive content and “mere
stimuli” does not mark a definitive and permanent metaphysical divide between different
realms of reality, instead it simply concerns how we are prepared to embrace, handle, and
account for the things falling under these categories. That is, we can predict expressions
with a definitive content, in the sense that we know what beliefs they are used to express
and how they are related to other established expressions in our culture. These sorts of
noises  can be used to express beliefs  precisely because they have a role in different
patterns  of  justification,  and  they  can  thus  serve  as  reasons  for  beliefs.  However,
metaphors as unfamiliar noises, which lack definitive and predictable cognitive content,
cannot enter into the patterns of justification.
24 The functioning of a metaphorical expression however changes as the metaphor begins to
lose its metaphorical character, in other words when the metaphor begins to acquire a
determinate content similar to that which literal expressions possess. As a result of this
development, metaphors “cross the line from ‘mere’ causes of belief to reasons for belief”
(ibid.: 171). For both Rorty and Davidson, the difference between metaphors and other
expressions of language does not lie “deep within the noise itself” but it is precisely a
function of  how the expression operates in a community.  When a specified meaning
becomes  more  widely  associated  with  a  particular  metaphorical  expression  –  a
development Rorty calls “a process of familiarization” – that expression can be used to
express a specified belief and it can thus begin to serve as a reason for belief. In the
course of this process, the metaphor gradually becomes “stale,” in the sense that the
similarities and ways of connecting associated with the metaphor become fixed. As a
result, the metaphor loses its dynamicity and unpredictable character, that is, precisely
those qualities that initially inspired Rorty to attach such a high value to metaphors in his
postmetaphysical culture.
25 However, the process of familiarization is not completely a negative happening. Though
becoming stale, the metaphor nevertheless enriches a community with a particular and
novel way of making sense of the surrounding world or, as Rorty himself puts it,  the
familiarization of a metaphor enlarges “logical space” (ibid.: 124). Rorty maintains that we
may find the insights some metaphors afford “so compelling that we try to make them
candidates for belief, for literal truth” (ibid.). In other words, we try to make more and
more people familiar with the interpretation of the metaphor we have found significant
and to make them assign to it the same expressive content as we do. Now the value of the
process of familiarization for the capacities required in the enhancement of solidarity lies
in the fact that the metaphor’s becoming familiar to a larger group of people requires,
within a community, a more wide-ranging utilization of imaginative mental capacities.
Without this sort of more extended use of imagination from the members of a community
the particular outlook associated with the metaphor could not become fixed as widely as
is required in the process of the metaphor’s crossing the line from an unfamiliar noise to
becoming  a  part  of  our  patterns  of  justification.  The  metaphor  must  first  become
common currency for the community, so to speak, before it can enlarge logical space. A
communal use of imagination is precisely what is required in incorporating a metaphor
into a community. Thus, metaphors are not only significant as unfamiliar noises that
cause surprising cognitions and that as a result make us reweave our web of beliefs and
desires but the way in which metaphors become more widely used and familiar to a
community has its own valuable outcomes as well.
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V. Rorty and the Prospects of Pragmatist Aesthetics
26 Explicating the cultural significance Rorty attaches to metaphors through the naturalistic
understanding of their functioning he draws from Davidson’s view provides new insights
into the value metaphors may have for the liberalist goals characterizing Rorty’s social
philosophy. It also reveals some new aspects in Rorty’s work related to aesthetics, for
example  that  it  includes  emphases  and  ideas  similar  to  those  found  in  some  other
pragmatist-inspired  aesthetic  theories.  This  conclusion,  I  believe,  has  some  wider
implications for the place of pragmatism within contemporary aesthetics. Below, I shall
sketch some of those implications.
27 One  might  think  that  pragmatist  aesthetics  would  be  one  of  the  most  flourishing
traditions  of  contemporary  aesthetics.  Consider,  for  example,  that  one  of  the  major
figures  of  pragmatist  philosophy,  John Dewey,  wrote  a  treatise  on  aesthetics,  Art  as
Experience, which is marked by a richness and breadth of concern with very few equals in
other  philosophical  traditions.  Pragmatism’s  prospects  for  providing  an  interesting
outlook  on  aesthetics  is  also  shown  by  a  claim  Dewey  presented  in  1930,  which
proclaimed that the next great era of philosophy “will emerge when the significance of
the social sciences and arts has become the object of reflective attention in the same way
that mathematical and physical sciences have been made the objects of thought in the
past,  and when their  full  import  is  grasped” (Dewey 1980/30:  18).  Yet,  pragmatism’s
position within contemporary aesthetics does not correspond to the expectations these
factors create. The tradition of Anglo-American aesthetics is still dominated by analytic
aesthetics  which  has  sometimes  understood  itself  as  a  direct  reaction  against  the
murkiness and conceptual inaccuracies that Dewey’s aesthetics has been considered to be
characterized by.3
28 Pragmatism’s significance for aesthetics, however, has not yet been examined in full. If
Rorty’s views are not after all plagued by the kinds of problems Shusterman insists they
are, it might be the case that precisely the Rortian themes raised in this paper are able to
open  up  previously  unexamined  pathways  for  pragmatist  aesthetics.  One  important
reason why I believe these themes are worth a more detailed examination is that the
aspects of Rorty’s philosophy of literature relating to the social and cultural function of
art and the aesthetic the above reading reveals, overlap in some significant ways with the
central  tenets  of  John  Dewey’s  aesthetic  theory.  Rorty  and  Dewey  just  use  a  partly
different  terminology  in  connection  with  them,  Rorty  addressing  them  in  terms  of
metaphor, while Dewey talks about imagination.
29 Imagination  has  an  important  part  in  Dewey’s  aesthetics.  For  Dewey,  “aesthetic
experience is  imaginative” (ibid.:  272).  What I  take Dewey to mean by this is  that in
aesthetic experience different individual elements form a complex unity and imagination
is precisely the capacity that makes this tying possible. “When old and familiar things are
made new in experience,  there is  imagination […],”  writes  Dewey (ibid.:  267).  Dewey
emphasizes  the  communal  and  cultural  importance  of  imagination,  and  some  moral
philosophers and philosophers of education have developed the Deweyan conception of
imagination further in their own fields. Dewey’s aesthetics has also been considered in
these contexts,4 though not that thoroughly. Given the important position of imagination
in Dewey’s aesthetic theory, these fields are arguably important for pragmatist aesthetics
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as  well,  and  the  ideas  introduced  in  them  can  bring  new  viewpoints  and  issues  to
pragmatist aesthetics.
30 It is however important to note with regard to an examination of the relevance of Rorty’s
work for aesthetics that Dewey’s and Rorty’s difference is only terminological. Rorty uses
the concept of metaphor to tap into problems similar to those Dewey addresses. This is
not a surprise, given that metaphor and imagination have a similar structure, namely to
show something in  a  new light.  In  fact,  in  some of  his  later  works,  Rorty  explicitly
addresses the theme of cultural development through the notion of imagination, and he
ascribes to that faculty the same kind of cultural role that he in his earlier works assigned
to metaphors.5 In this respect, it is highly likely that Rorty’s neopragmatism is able to
make an important contribution to a pragmatist view of aesthetics emphasizing the social
and cultural significance of imagination and aesthetic experience.
31 Developments also in philosophy of literature open up new prospects for pragmatism. In
his recent work Fiction and the Weave of Life, John Gibson presents a multifarious critique
of analytic philosophy of literature, which in many respects relies on ideas similar to
those central to forms of pragmatism. The critical edge of Gibson’s work is directed to a
tradition  in  analytic  aesthetics  in  which  the  issue  regarding  the  cognitive  value  of
literature is framed as the problem of the referents of fictive names and how fictional
sentences can possess truth-content. The major shortcoming Gibson sees in this tradition
is that it approaches the problem of fiction too narrowly as a purely semantic question
(Gibson 2007:  6-7).  Gibson’s  goal  is  not  to  provide  a  more  successful  analysis  of  the
semantics of fictive uses of language but to undermine the position of this set of questions
in attempts to shed light on the cognitive value of literature. He tries to open up a wider
outlook  on  the  relationship  of  fictional  works  to  reality  than  semantic  approaches
provide. A central feature of Gibson’s critique is to show that the conception of language
underlying the received understanding of the problem of fiction is too heavily bound to
the  idea  that  language’s  capacity  to  represent  the  world  serves  as  its  source  of
meaningfulness. In this conception, language is in other words understood as a picture of
reality. Fictional language appears problematic from this perspective precisely because it
does not represent any worldly affairs (ibid.: 50-5).
32 As  a  basis  for  his  criticism,  Gibson offers  an  alternative  picture  of  how language  is
connected with reality.  He draws heavily on the philosophy of  language of  the later
Wittgenstein  in  which  the  meaningfulness  of  language  is  explained  in  terms  of  the
various roles pieces of language have in the rule-guided language games making up our
linguistic  community.  Where  Gibson  sees  the  value  of  Wittgenstein’s  ideas  to  lie  is
precisely in their presentation of “a thoroughly social, cultural conception of language,”
which  makes  it  possible  to  abandon  the  metaphysical  commitments  regarding  the
relationship between language and world involved in the language as a picture of reality
conception (ibid.: 60).
33 Especially the reflections Wittgenstein puts forth on the standard metre stored in the
Paris Archive are important for Gibson’s aims. In his view, Wittgenstein’s example is a
particularly illuminating case of how there are other ways of being in connection with
reality than through representation. According to Wittgenstein, the standard metre is a
peculiar object in the respect that “one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that
it  is  not one metre long […]” (Wittgenstein 2001/1953:  § 122).  This is  to say that the
standard metre is not an instance of a metaphysical entity “being one metre long,” but it
itself explains what it means to be one metre long. With his peculiar description of the
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standard metre, Wittgenstein’s aim in Gibson’s view is not to ascribe some property to the
object. Rather, it is intended to draw attention to “the role the standard metre has in the
practice of measurement” (Gibson 2007: 64). The standard metre is not a representation
of a metre; it provides the standards for representing something as being one metre long
and in this respect it is a means of giving structure to the world and one’s experience of
it.
34 Gibson’s explanation of how fictional works of literature connect with reality builds upon
the Wittgensteinian analysis of the standard metre. The events fictional works portray
should not be understood as representations of real world events but, like the standard
metre, they are to be understood as providing standards for a group of concepts by which
we represent the world. A decisive difference between the standard metre and works of
literary fiction, however, is that the cultural concepts, that is, such concepts as “love,”
“suffering,”  “exploitation,”  and  “devotion,”  the  contents  of  which  literary  works
illuminate, are more complex than the practice of measuring and the concepts it includes.
The standards for the concepts which Gibson sees as the focus points of literary fiction
are not grounded on an unequivocal object “but upon very elaborate visions of human
life” (ibid.: 71). Despite their complexity, it is, nevertheless, possible to formulate some
standards for the application of these concepts and for Gibson, the narrative traditions of
different  cultures,  by  presenting  us  “refined,  varied,  and  complex  possibilities  of
perception and description,” serve as the archives for constructing standards for their
application (ibid.).  For example,  Gibson argues that  in Notes  from Underground,  Feodor
Dostoevsky brings to our attention a suffering that “arises from a condition of mind in
which one’s self and one’s world come to appear at once alien and revolting.” Gibson
continues by noting that Dostoevsky’s work does not present a “mimetic duplication” of a
case of suffering but in reading it we are engaged with “an object that is constitutive of a
way in which we can see our world […].” In this respect, literary works have a kind of
primacy  to  representation.  They  do  not  themselves  represent  cultural  practices  but
rather they form a ground for making sense of them (ibid.: 129).
35 Within the confines of this article, it is impossible to give a more detailed examination of
Gibson’s view of fiction. What is more interesting in this context is to observe the over-
laps between Gibson’s philosophy of literature and pragmatist philosophy and aesthetics.
It is for example noteworthy that the critical attitude towards the problem of fiction
Gibson  takes  is  in  many  respects  similar  to  Rorty’s.  Like  Gibson,  Rorty  criticizes
approaches to fiction which treat it primarily as a question about the semantics of fictive
sentences. Rorty focuses on the tradition stemming from Bertrand Russell’s analysis of
fictive sentences. For Rorty, too, it is central to reveal that this approach to fiction is tied
to  an  understanding  of  language  in  which  linguistic  items  are  seen  to  derive  their
meaning from a relationship of representation to worldly objects and state of affairs, in
other words precisely the same picture view of language that according to Gibson has
dominated the issue regarding the cognitive significance of fiction (Rorty 1982/81: 110-4).
Moreover, the cure Rorty offers for overcoming this framework is precisely the same as
Gibson’s, namely the late Wittgensteinian view of language as a cluster of language games
(ibid.: 129). For Rorty, its significance is precisely in that it involves a wholly different
view of  how language is  connected with reality  than the picture theory of  language
presents. Once the late Wittgensteinian view is embraced, the very meaningfulness of the
questions found central to a successful analysis of the cognitive value of literature in the
contemporary discussion on fiction in Rorty’s opinion evaporates. That is, “philosophical
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problems about fiction simply do not arise once the picture picture is dropped,” argues
Rorty (ibid.: 130). This, again, is very much in line with Gibson’s position.
36 There are also other points of  contact between Gibson’s philosophy of literature and
pragmatist  philosophy and aesthetics.  First,  Gibson opposes dualisms and separations
similar  to  those  different  forms of  pragmatism have tried to  overcome,  and second,
besides the later Wittgenstein, Gibson cites other figures who have been associated with
the pragmatist tradition, such as Wilfrid Sellars, whose critique of empiricism and the
distinction between the space of causes and the space of reasons it includes forms an
important part of Gibson’s critical examination of contemporary analytic philosophy of
literature  (Gibson 2007:  54-5,  61).  Finally,  Gibson’s  attempt  to  see  fiction in  a  wider
perspective than as a purely semantic question can be seen to be at least partly similar in
spirit  to  Davidson’s  attempt  to  move  the  problem  of  metaphor  outside  the  pale  of
semantics.
37 What, however, is noteworthy is that despite these overlaps in his book Gibson nowhere
discusses pragmatist accounts of art and the aesthetic at length. Rorty and Shusterman
are mentioned only in passing and Dewey’s views are not discussed at all. This oversight
is a shame, for by providing a multifarious picture of the ways in which works of art are
connected with aspects of human life different forms of pragmatism give a possibility for
a highly systematic account of literature’s relationship to reality, and hence they can
supplement Gibson’s account. A more detailed development of this pragmatist view of
literature  needs  to  be  left  for  another  occasion.  However,  it  is  my  belief  that  the
naturalistic conception of metaphor Rorty draws from Davidson’s work and the view of
literature’s social role he develops on the basis of it will form a significant part of this
more  fully-fledged  pragmatist  account.  In  this  respect,  my  view of  the  relevance  of
Rorty’s work for aesthetics and philosophy of art is quite different from Shusterman’s.
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NOTES
1. See, for example, Brandom (2000: 160-1), Tartaglia (2007: 126), Williams (2009: xxvii-xxix).
2. For  example,  in  his  recent  monograph  (Malecki  2010)  on  Shusterman’s  aesthetic  theory,
Wojcieh Malecki discusses neither Rorty’s naturalism nor the effect Davidson’s conception of
metaphor had on Rorty’s philosophy of literature.
3. For example, Arnold Isenberg called Dewey’s Art as Experience “a hodgepodge of conflicting
methods  and undisciplined speculations”  (Isenberg  1987:  128).  For  more on the  reception of
Dewey’s work within analytic aesthetics see Leddy 2005.
4. See especially Fesmire 2003.
5. See Rorty 2007.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper outlines a pragmatist aesthetic theory on the basis of themes relating to naturalism,
metaphor, and solidarity found in Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism. A central part of this attempt
is to show that some previous readings of Rorty’s work in aesthetics are misguided. I begin by
raising aspects of Rorty’s work that have been previously largely overlooked in aesthetics and
philosophy  of  art,  and  which  I  believe  undermine  particularly  Richard  Shusterman’s  critical
reading of Rorty. I shall then move on to discuss the social role Rorty assigns to metaphors in his
postmetaphysical liberalist culture and argue that the social and cultural view of art and the
aesthetic  Rorty’s  philosophy of  literature contains overlaps in some significant respects with
some central points of John Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics. I close by outlining some new set of
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